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SUMMARY
Proper safety measures can make positive contributions toward in-
creased production and reduced operating expense. Basic maxims for such
programs can be summarized as (1) risk can never be completely eliminated,
(2) care and effort can reduce risk, and (3) efforts to reduce risk should
achieve maximum possible benefits.
It is taken here that risk increases with the likelihood of some
hazardous event, with exposure to that hazard, and with possible conse-
quences of the event. Numerical scales for these three factors are de-
veloped; an overall risk score is then given as the product of these
three factors. This risk score can be correlated with experience and
ranges from a situation where an operation should be discontinued through
one where attention is needed, and down to one where the risk is consid-
ered acceptable by our current social standards.
Justification for a proposed risk reduction measure is taken as in-
creasing with increasing risk score and with effectiveness of the pro-
posed measure, and decreasing with increased costs. A justification
factor so assigned varies from that for a highly worthwhile effort down
to efforts of doubtful merit. Such assigned justification factors make
it possible to establish realistic priorities within the safety program.
The mathematical operations involved here are relatively simple and
are performed either algebraically or graphically on nomographs. These
nomographs permit direct entry through descriptive terms; they give both
numerical and descriptive answers. Such answers are meaningful not only
to safety personnel but also to management and operating personnel. The




A successful accident prevention program, aside from its humanitar-
ian aspects, makes positive contributions to production rates and to
reduced operating expense. Much progress in such a program has been
made in the last few decades. However, there is still room for improve-
ment, which is well indicated by the observation that currently in the
United States each year there are about 2,500,000 work-related disabling
accidents with about 50,000,000 man-days of lost time and some 14,000
fatalities, and that the cost of such accidents is about $14 ,000,000 ,000
-
1
A safety management program designed to reduce the toll from indus-
trial accidents requires considerable thought, effort, and compromise,
or it can prove to be both wasteful and ineffective. A mathematical
approach that avoids these defects is presented here.
SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
A safety program should be based on documented factual information
and on informed judgement, and not on subjectivity or intuition. Like-
wise, safety recommendations should be quantitative in nature so that
alternative proposals can readily be evaluated, urgencies assessed, and
safety priorities established. Furthermore, to be effective all safety
terms should be expressed simply so that they are understandable by both
operating and management personnel. 2 ' 3
Safety programs, desirable as they are, present difficulties. One
concerns the level of effort that should be devoted to a safety program.
A low level of effort may be inadequate and not achieve its purpose.
Alternatively, the effort can be so intense that an entire operation is
hampered to such an extent that no useful work can be accomplished.
1 Aooident Facts, published annually by the National Safety Council
,
425 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago, 111.
2 Rollin H. Simonds and John V. Grimaldi. Safety Management:
Accident Cost and Control. Homewood, 111., Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963.
3 H. W. Henrich. Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific
Approach. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959.
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From such considerations it follows that there is a best safety program
for each situation. The following material describes one method for
achieving this optimum.
Hazard
The word "hazard" implies a definite danger, particularly from some
unanticipated and possibly fortuitous event that is beyond one's immedi-
ate control. Examples include such hazards as a passenger being killed
in an automobile accident— there are some 50,000 such fatalities in the
United States each year; being struck by lightning; and choking to death
on a bite of steak. It is apparent that our ordinary daily activities
expose us to many such hazards. Table 1 lists some of these using data
from standard sources such as the National Safety Council 1 and World
Almanacs.
TABLE 1. Some Well-Known Hazards Encountered in Daily Activities.
United States, 1975.
Hazard Risk
Riding in an automobile 56,000 fatalities
Working 14,200 fatalities; 2,500,000
disabling accidents
Flying 1,500 fatalities
Swimming 7 , 300 drownings
Staying home 6,800 fatalities from 2,700,000
fires
Going to church 10 to 15 fatalities from 4,300
fires
Eating a steak 3,000 choking to death
Playing golf 150 killed by lightning
Nuclear power plant incidents None
Risk
The word "risk," or the equivalent phrase "amount of risk," indi-
cates the chance that some particular hazard may actually cause injury
or damage. Risk can be described in statistical-like terms. Thus the
risk involved in riding in an automobile can be expressed by the obser-
vation that in the United States there are some 45 driver-plus-passenger
fatalities per 1,000,000,000 vehicle miles. The risk of being killed by
lightning while playing golf can be described as about one fatality per
10,000,000 golf games, and the risk of choking to death on a steak as




TABLE 2. Amounts of Risk Typically Considered Acceptable,
United States, 1975.
Hazard Risk
Riding in an automobile 45 fatalities per 10 vehicle-
miles; 1 fatality per 1,000
rider-years
Flying, scheduled flights 1.3 fatalities per 10 9 pas-
senger miles
Flying, all flights 20 fatalities per 10 9 rider-
miles
Working 1 fatality per 4,500 worker-
years
Riding a bicycle 1 hospitalization per 10 4
rider-miles
Hurricanes 1 fatality per 2,500,000 per-
son-years
All accidents 1 fatality per 1600 person-
years
Nuclear reactor operation 1 "incident" per 3 x 10 8
reactor-years
The Acceptable Risk
Since we cannot completely avoid all the hazards in our ordinary
lives, all risk from such hazards can never be completely eliminated.
However, one often takes steps to reduce the risk associated with some
particular hazard. Thus when we drive carefully with seat belts fas-
tened, we reduce the risk of becoming an automobile accident fatality.
Similarly we avoid open stretches of a golf course when a thunderstorm
is impending, and we eat our steaks in well-chewed small bites.
The above lugubrious thoughts serve to introduce the concept of
the acceptable risk, as suggested by Dr. Billings Brown of the Safety
Division of the American Ordnance Association. An acceptable risk can
be defined as that real risk imposed by some hazard, but one that under
the circumstances would not deter a knowledgeable and prudent person.
Thus, the risks of riding in an automobile, playing golf, or eating a
steak, are regarded by some people as acceptable risks. In any event
such risks often seem preferred over never driving or riding in an




Convenience plays a part in setting an acceptable level of risk.
Thus the risk of being killed in an automobile accident is about one per
1,000 rider-years and obviously is considered acceptable to many of us.
This acceptance must be based in part on a rationalization such as, "I
will never live for one thousand years, hence I will never be one of
these fatalities."
Other circumstances play a part in determining what risk is accept-
able. This can be illustrated by comparing data for riding in airplanes
with those for riding in automobiles. The risk of traveling by airplane
is far less than traveling by automobile, but there are some people who
avoid airplane travel even though they ride in automobiles. And what is
considered an acceptable level for risk in industrial work is well below
that considered acceptable in either the airplane or automobile mode of
travel. This low level of acceptable risk for industrial work merits
approval; however, to achieve and maintain this level requires effort,




The basic thoughts behind the observations above can be formalized
in safety maxims, as follows:
1. All the many hazards in life cannot be completely avoided, and
all risks from such hazards can never be completely eliminated.
2. Careful thought and effort can often reduce the risks in ordin-
ary life down to acceptable levels.
3. Our limited resources of time and effort should be utilized
for maximum benefits of risk reduction rather than being dissipated in
hopeless efforts to completely eliminate certain selected risks.
These safety maxims are well accepted in the technical community
even though in some situations, legal ones for example, they may not be
considered relevant. These safety maxims have led to a system as de-
veloped here for quantitative characterization of risks and for evalu-
ation of proposed risk-reduction procedures. This system uses numerical
values for comparison purposes. It also provides descriptive terms that
are meaningful, not only to safety personnel but also to those in man-
agement and in operations. Such a system was first suggested in a re-
port by William T. Fine, and many of the evaluations here are based on
that report. **
4 Naval Ordnance Laboratory. Mathematical Evaluations for Con-
trolling Hazards, by William T. Fine. White Oak, Md., NOL, 1971.
(NOLTR 71-31, publication UNCLASSIFIED.)
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RISK CALCULATION
The risk imposed by some particular hazard can be taken as increas-
ing (1) with the likelihood that the hazardous event will actually occur
,
(2) with exposure to that event, and (3) with possible consequences of
that event. For risk calculations, numerical values are assigned to
each of these three factors. Then an overall risk score is computed as
the product of these three separate factors. The numerical values, al-
though arbitrarily chosen, are self-consistent and together they provide
a realistic but relative score for the overall risk.
Likelihood of Hazardous Event
The likelihood of occurrence of a hazardous event is related to
the mathematical probability that it might actually occur. For purposes
here, however, likelihood is expressed in alternative terms of expecta-
tions. Likelihoods that may be encountered in practical safety situa-
tions range from the completely unexpected and unanticipated, but re-
motely possible, up to an event that might well be expected at some
future time.
An example of the first of these, an unexpected but remotely pos-
sible event, is failure of a proof-tested container of compressed gases.
For mathematical purposes the likelihood factor for such an event is
arbitrarily assigned the value of unity. An example of the second type
of hazardous event, one which might well be expected at some future
time, is combustible material catching on fire in a drying oven, par-
ticularly if this has happened in the recent past. The likelihood fac-
tor for such an event is assigned the value of 10.
These two likelihoods provide reference points on a scale of like-
lihoods for ordinary hazardous events. Situations between these two
reference likelihoods are then readily assigned intermediate values.
For example, a "could happen" type of event is assigned a likelihood
value such as six, and an event that would be unusual, but still quite
possible, is assigned a value of three.
Safety considerations must provide not only for all such possible
situations, but also for ones that approach the impossible. The abso-
lutely impossible event would be assigned a likelihood value of zero.
However, no event that can be described can ever be considered as being
absolutely impossible; that is, have a mathematical probability of zero.
Nevertheless, its probability can approach zero so closely that the
event is virtually impossible. A likelihood value of one-tenth is
assigned to this virtually impossible situation, which thus becomes
another reference point for the likelihood scale.
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This two-decade scale for likelihood factors ranges from the value
of one- tenth for the virtually impossible event, through the value of
unity for an unexpected but remotely possible event, up to the value of
10 for an expected event. These reference points plus interpolated
values are as follows:
Likelihood Value
''Might well be expected 10
Quite possible 6
Unusual but possible 3
*0nly remotely possible 1




The greater the exposure to a potentially dangerous situation the
greater is the associated risk. To provide for this, the value of unity
is assigned to the situation of a rather rare exposure, perhaps only a
very few times per year. Then the value of 10 is assigned for continu-
ous exposure. Interpolation between these two reference points provides
for intermediate values, thus the value of three is assigned for a weekly
exposure. Extrapolation is needed to provide for situations of a very







*Rare (a few per year) 1
Very rare (yearly) 0.5
Factors for Possible Consequences
Damage from a hazardous event can range all the way from minor
damage that is barely noticeable up to the catastrophic. This very wide
range is taken as extending over two decades in numerical values. Thus
the reference value of unity is assigned for the noticeable situation
and the value of 100 for the catastrophic.
*Reference point.
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The noticeable situation is taken as one that involves a material
damage of perhaps $100, or an incident that would be classified as a
minor first aid accident. The catastrophic situation is taken as one
where there are many fatalities, or where there is a material loss of
millions of dollars. Intermediate factors are readily assigned; for
example, a disaster with a few fatalities or with material damage greater
than about $1,000,000 would carry the value of 40. Also included are the
very serious, the serious, and the important situations. Consequence
factors and values for these situations are included below:
Possible consequence Value
*Catastrophe (many fatalities, or >$10 7 damage).... 100
Disaster (few fatalities, or >$10° damage) 40
Very serious (fatality, or >$10 5 damage) 15
Serious (serious injury, or >$10 t+ damage) 7
Important (disability, or >$10 3 damage) 3
^Noticeable (minor first aid accident, or
>$ 100 damage) 1
It can be noted that the relation between possible material damage and
the consequence factor can be represented by the empirical formula
factor = (damage/100) - 4
Consequence factors have two rather different aspects. One is
personnel injury or fatality, or both. The other is material damage.
In spite of possible objections, practicalities of the situation dictate
a common scale for these two quite different items (such as for liabil-
ity insurance) . Such a common scale has an advantage in that it can
provide for situations where both personal injury and material damage
might occur; here the consequence factor is a weighted sum of its two
diverse aspects.
Risk Score
The risk score for some potentially hazardous situation is given
numerically as the product of three factors: one numerical value each
for likelihood, for exposure, and for possible consequences.
Numerical risk scores, as so computed, can readily be associated
with the risks observed for actual situations. Thus experience indi-
cates that a risk score as low as 20 represents a situation of low risk,
one considered acceptable by our current standards for industrial work.
*Reference point.
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Such a risk is far less than the risks we ordinarily accept in everyday
situations; "for example, when we drive to work, when we mow the lawn
with a power mower, or when we ride a bicycle for exercise.
Experience also indicates that a situation with a risk score in the
order of 70 to 200 is one with substantial risk where, according to our
current social standards, correction is needed (the social standards of
years ago were not so demanding). Then there can be higher risk situ-
ations; a risk score of 200 to 400 indicates that correction is urgently
needed. A very high risk score of more than 400 indicates a situation
so risky that one should consider ceasing operation until at least in-
terim measures to correct the deficiency can be implemented, or perhaps
permanent shutdown becomes necessary if the operation cannot be made
safe. These risk score classifications are based on experience and are
subject to adjustment when experience indicates otherwise. However the
classifications are very conservative and therefore provide strong state-
ments for the risks involved.
Risk score Risk situation
>400 Very high risk; consider discontinuing
operation
200 to 400 High risk; immediate correction required
70 to 200 Substantial risk; correction needed
20 to 70 Possible risk; attention indicated
>20 Risk; perhaps acceptable
Graphical Calculation of Risk Score
Risk scores, defined above as products of three factors, can with
some convenience be calculated graphically as shown in Figure 1. The
likelihoods are listed on the first or left line of this nomograph. The
scale is logarithmic in nature and is graduated so that distances along
this line are proportional to the logarithms of the likelihood factors.
However, only descriptive terms appear, and the actual numbers have been
omitted. The value of zero corresponding to a hypothetical "absolutely
impossible" situation cannot be shown along this line as the logarithm
of zero is minus infinity. Exposure factors are listed on the second
line in the nomograph. Factors for possible consequences appear along
the fourth line.
To calculate a risk score using this nomograph, locations corres-
ponding to each factor involved are first established. Then a line is
drawn from the point for the likelihood factor through that for the ex-
posure factor and extended to the tie line at the center. (Location
along this tie line corresponds to the product of these two factors, but
the numbers have been omitted.) A second line is drawn from this point
on the tie line through that for the consequence factor and extended to
the scale for the risk score. A numerical value for this risk score and







































Evaluation of a Proposed Risk-Reduction Action
The larger the risk score for a situation, the more effective a
proposed corrective action, and the less that action costs, the greater
is the justification. A quantitative index for this justification can
be derived from numerical values assigned to each of its three component
factors. These are considered separately.
Effectiveness Value
The effectiveness value assigned to a proposed risk-reduction
action is taken as unity for complete elimination of risk, and zero for
an action with no effect. Intermediate values are assigned accordingly;
for example, a measure that would reduce risk by about 60% would be as-
signed an effectiveness value of 0.6.
COST CONSIDERATIONS
Cost and justification bear an inverse relation. Thus a cost fac-
tor is best expressed as a divisor whose numerical value increases with
cost so that increased cost gives lesser justification.
Experience indicates that the divisor for cost is approximately
proportional to the cube root of the total dollar amount included.
These dollar amounts include actual out-of-pocket cost plus capitalized
costs for any increase in operating or overhead expenses. On this basis
the reference value of unity is assigned to the divisor representing a
total cost of $100, and the value of 10 for costs of 1,000 times greater,
or $100,000. The mathematical relation can be expressed in the form of
an equation:
if to..v,tal costdxvrsor = y[ —
Cost Effectiveness
A justification factor for a proposed risk-reduction action can be
obtained mathematically by multiplying the risk score for a given situ-
ation by the effectiveness factor for the proposed action and then
dividing by its cost divisor. This justification factor can be taken
as the cost effectiveness for the proposed action. Numerical values
for this cost effectiveness have been correlated with experience. Thus,
a justification value of less than about 10 indicates that a proposal
is of doubtful merit. The small risk reduction does not justify the
indicated expenditure of time, effort, and money, and such endeavors
could well be more effective in other situations. Values between 10 and
20 indicate that action is justified. Experience suggests that a
12
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justification value greater than about 20 indicates a highly worthwhile
risk-reduction action.
These values for the justification factor provide reference points
for an entire scale of justification factors. This scale permits ready
comparison of the merits of various proposals for reduction of identi-
fied risk. The scale is also a great aid in establishing priorities
within a broad risk-reduction program.
Graphical Calculation for Cost Effectiveness
The justification factor provides an index for cost effectiveness,
and like the risk score can be calculated graphically as shown in Figure
2. Entry to this nomograph is by three factors: one numerical value
each for risk score as calculated previously, for degree of risk reduc-
tion that the proposed measure provides, and for its cost divisor.
Lines through these points give both a numerical value and a descriptive
term for the justification factor.
The graphical methods have several advantages over the algebraic. (1)
When using the nomographs there is no need to refer to separate tables
for values because entry can be made directly through the descriptive
items of the chart. (2) The arithmetic calculation is simpler when done
graphically and, although it is of limited precision, this is quite sat-
isfactory for purposes here. (3) The graphical solution automatically
provides documentation for both the risk analysis and justification cal-
culation.
ANALYSIS OF A HAZARDOUS SITUATION
Risk Score Calculation
An access road in a processing plant carries occasional traffic
passing a large tank containing propane. There is a possibility that a
loaded truck on this access road might accidentally swerve from the road
at a point near the tank and crash into it. If so, the tank might fail
and spill its highly flammable contents. Then if these contents caught
on fire, the damage could be substantial. Loss of the tank and its con-
tents and damage inflicted on neighboring parts of the plant could cost
as much as $250,000. What is the risk score for this situation?
Algebraic Solution .
1. The chain of incidents described is conceivable but quite un-
likely. The likelihood factor is assigned a value of 0.5
2. Only occasional exposure (weekly) is involved. This factor
































3. As for possible consequences, serious personal injuries would
not be expected. For material damage of about $250,000, a consequence
factor is assigned (by interpolation) a value of 25
4. Risk score: 0.5 x 3 x 25 = (rounded) 30
This risk score of about 30 lies within the range of possible risk,
and some attention is indicated.
Graphical Solution . The above calculation can readily be performed
graphically using Figure 1. First of the entry points are for desig-
nated likelihood and exposure. A line through these is extended to the
tie line and then drawn through the point for possible consequences onto
the line for risk score. The risk score indicated here lies at about 30
and is described as a possible risk, and some attention is indicated.
This agrees with the algebraic results.
Justification Factor Calculation
It is suggested that the tank of the above risk score calculation
be moved to a more remote location, one about 100 feet (30 meters) from
the access road. This move would eliminate perhaps as much as 75% of
the risk associated with the postulated accident. It is estimated that
the move with its necessary replumbing would cost about $30,000. What





Risk score as computed above 30
2. Value for 75% risk reduction 0.75
3. Divisor for costs, cube root of (30,000/100) 6.7
4. Justification factor and cost effectiveness
30 x 0.75 t 6.7 3.3
A cost effectiveness of only 3.3 indicates that the suggestion is of
doubtful merit. But since the risk score of 30 indicates that some
possible risk is present, it appears that alternative methods for risk
control should be investigated.
It is suggested that a sturdy guard rail properly placed along the
road could reduce the risk of damage here considerably, perhaps as much
as 50%. Such a guard rail should cost only about $400. What is the
justification factor and the cost effectiveness for this proposed safety
action?
Algebraic Solution .
1. Risk factor as computed above 30
2. Value for 50% risk reduction 0.5
15
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3. Divisor for costs, cube root of (400/100) 1.6
4. Justification factor and cost effectiveness:
30 x 0.5 v 1.6 9.3
A cost effectiveness of 9.3 indicates that the action suggested in
this proposal is justified, but not overwhelmingly so. Nonetheless, it
is to be preferred over the somewhat more effective but far more expen-
sive action of moving the tank. But in view of such a moderate justifi-
cation, perhaps alternative proposals should also be investigated. For
example, would a well-enforced speed limit be a preferred action? Or
should action with regard to this specific risk be deferred in favor of
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